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Abstract   Analysts should correct for distributional differences before undertaking local progressivity
comparisons between income tax or tax and benefit schedules. A transplant-and-compare procedure is advocated,
involving ￿importation’ of the schedule from one regime into another, or from both into a reference scenario. The
residual progression ordering over transplanted schedules then assures a global ordering of original regimes by
Lorenz or Suits curves. The algorithm is advocated for use only when transplantation functions are isoelastic, and
is illustrated for the Canadian, Israeli and UK tax and benefit systems.  
1.  INTRODUCTION
A tax schedule with high marginal rates can have less progressivity than another with low
marginal rates. This is because it matters for progressivity where the taxpayers are located: there
may be few people actually being taxed at high published rates, or a substantial number; the upper
tail of a schedule with mainly low rates could ‘catch’ most taxpayers, or none. The theorists
recognize these facts of life, and have distinguished local measures of structural progression of
an income tax or tax and benefit system from global measures of effective progression (also
known as progressivity). The practitioners now typically conduct international and intertemporal
comparisons in a split manner, examining schedules locally, using the elasticity measures known
as residual and liability progression, and evaluating effective progression in summary, using
indices of redistributive effect and disproportionality which subsume distributional differences
rather than revealing their röle. 
Despite the fact that close scrutiny of schedular differences can be misleading when judged
in isolation from the income distributions to which the schedules apply, the landmark results of
Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1977), which predict unambiguous redistributive effects from2 Much of what we do will also apply to the liability progression ordering of income tax schedules, and thence to
effects on the distribution of the income tax burden. See on.
3 Partial orderings involve dominance configurations between such curves;  complete orderings are provided by
indices such as those of Suits (1977) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). 
2
residual progression comparisons, are still invoked. The predictions are mathematically valid, but
they are only made by positing a fixed and common distribution of pre-tax income for all
schedules being compared. Though this is plainly unrealistic for both international and
intertemporal comparisons, the tradition of examining the residual progression of schedules along
the income scale persists.
In this paper we advocate a new procedure which analysts could use, based on residual
progression comparisons, to draw out correct distributional implications in international and
intertemporal comparisons of income taxes and tax and benefit systems. This involves a
transplant-and-compare procedure, in which the schedule is ￿imported’ from one regime into the
other, or from both into a reference or baseline scenario. Comparisons of residual progression are
then undertaken using what we shall call log transplant curves, and they lead, via  the
Jakobsson/Kakwani result, to valid and normatively significant redistributive conclusions
predicated on actual income distributions.
2  We also reveal a link with the procedure suggested
by Hayes et al. (1995), whereby the residual progression of different income tax schedules is
compared at common percentile points in the relevant pre-tax income distributions. Under certain
conditions to be revealed, this procedure is equivalent to ours and has the same  normative
significance.  
Comparisons of effective progression based on Lorenz and Suits (1977) curves take
account of pre-tax inequality.
3 The problems of reasoning from schedular changes were
anticipated by Musgrave and Thin (1948): "... the less equal the distribution of income before tax,
the more potent will be a (given) progressive tax structure in equalizing income" (page 510). The
effect of pre-tax distributional change on progressivity comparisons in the Lorenz and Suits
frameworks has been examined by Formby et al. (1981), Lambert and Pfähler (1992), Milanovic
(1994) and Seidl (1994), but the reformulation of local progression comparisons to take pre-tax
inequality differences into account is new.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains definitions and necessary
preliminaries. In section 3, we define the concept of a deformation of an income tax or tax and
benefit schedule, and outline the transplant-and-compare procedure, which is based on the4 Typically, of course, there are jumps in the marginal tax rate, e.g. at the threshold in the case of an income tax, and,
in the case of a tax and benefit system, between the rate of taper of benefits and first marginal tax rate. As Keen et al. (1999)
have recently shown, there are implications for results in the standard literature of admitting an income tax threshold; we will
note these at the relevant points but do not consider them important for the empirical procedure we advocate. Our assumptions
also deny the presence of horizontal inequity (HI), evidenced in taxes which are not a function only of income x, and/or net
income schedules which involve reranking, i.e. are non-monotonic. The thrust of much present-day research is to isolate the
vertical (progressivity) and horizontal effects of tax systems, substituting counterfactual HI-free smooth schedules T(x) and
N(x) in order to evaluate the former - we shall do this in the applications ahead - hence the non-importance of the
differentiability assumption. 
5 Liability progression, LPi(x), is similarly defined, as the elasticity of the schedule Ti(x), provided that Ti(x)g0. Ti(x)
is progressive if and only if RPi(x) < 1 for all x, equivalently if and only if LPi(x) > 1 for all x.
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deformation concept. In section 4, we identify the class of admissible deformations for this
procedure. In section 5, the transplant-and-compare procedure is illustrated using simple
examples, and related to methodology to take account of distributional differences in the existing
literature, including that of Hayes et al (1995). In section 6, issues of implementation are
discussed, and the procedure is applied using micro-data from Canada, Israel and the UK. In the
concluding section, we discuss the theoretical and empirical compromises involved in
implementing the new procedure, and offer some concluding remarks.
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND EXISTING LITERATURE
Let x be pre-tax or original income. For convenience of presentation, pre-tax income
distributions F(x) will be assumed continuous and strictly increasing on ￿++ , and income tax or
tax and benefit schedules T(x) will be assumed differentiable, with the property T(x)<x and
0￿T’(x)<1 ~x. Net or final income N(x) = x - T(x) thus satisfies N(x)>0 and 0<N’(x)￿1 ~x.
4 The
tax or tax and benefit system is progressive if and only if T(x)/x is increasing with x, equivalently,
N(x)/x is decreasing with x. The basic unit for analysis will be the regime <N,F>, comprising the
net income schedule and pre-tax income distribution pair.
The residual progression of schedule Ni(x) is its elasticity with respect to income x, and
will be denoted RPi(x). Hence RPi(x) = xNi’(x)/Ni(x), the ratio of the marginal to average
retention rates.
5 The partial ordering over schedules N by residual progression is denoted |RP: 
N1 |RP N2 @ RP1(x) ￿ RP2(x) ~x (1)
Given a pre-tax income distribution F(x), the Lorenz curve for pre-tax income will be
denoted LX(p), p=F(x)￿[0,1]. The Lorenz and Suits curves for income after application of Ni(x)
will be denoted LNi(p) and RNi(q) respectively, where q is the income share (q = LX(p) and RNi(q)
= LNi(p)). The Lorenz and Suits-based partial orderings of regimes <N,F> by their redistributive6 For income tax schedules Ti(x)>0 ~x the liability progression partial ordering |LP is defined as in (1), but over T1
and T2: T1 |LP T2 @ LP1(x)￿ LP2(x) ~x, and the corresponding link is with global orderings (of regimes <T1,F1> and <T2, F2>)
by Lorenz and Suits curves for the distribution of the income tax burden. For income tax schedules with thresholds, the content
of |LP (though not that of |RP) must be modified. Keen et al. (1999) show that the dominating schedule must have a higher
threshold as well as higher elasticity above its threshold, and then the link is the same. For tax and benefit systems, the cases
Ti(x)>0 and Ti(x)<0 (i=1,2) have to be treated separately in defining |LP, and there are problems in defining and comparing
curves for distributions of net taxes (which could sum to zero, for example). In Ebert and Lambert (1999), residual and liability
progression measures for tax and benefit systems are related to the corresponding measures for the tax and benefit components,
and the respective orderings are discussed. 
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effects will be denoted |L and |S:
<N1,F1> |L <N2,F2> @ LN1(p) - LX1(p) ￿ LN2(p) - LX2(p) ~p (2)
<N1,F1> |S <N2,F2> @ RN1(q) ￿ RN2(q) ~q (3)
The Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1977) result, already referred to, is this:
N1 |RP N2 @ <N1,F0> |L <N2,F0> ~Fo @ <N1,F0> |S <N2,F0>  ~Fo (4)
The local ordering of schedules is equivalent to the global ordering of regimes whenever the pre-
tax income distribution is the same.
6 
3. THE TRANSPLANT AND COMPARE PROCEDURE
To ‘correct’ income tax or tax and benefit schedules for pre-tax distributional differences
in regimes, prior to making local progression comparisons, we first define a deformation function:
Definition 
Let g:￿+￿￿+ be any monotone increasing function. The deformation N
g of a net income schedule




and the deformation <N,F>




-1>   (6)
where % is the composition operator. 
The interpretation is straightforward. If F is the distribution function for x, F%g
-1 is the
distribution function for g(x). If N maps an original income x into a final income y, N
g maps g(x)
into g(y). Hence N
g is the schedule induced by N on deformed incomes, and <N,F>
g is the regime
induced by <N,F> on the distribution of deformed incomes.
In mathematics, N
g is known as the conjugate by g of N within the group of real-valued
functions under the composition operator (Budden 1972, esp. §20). Important properties of the7 We return to this point later. For evidence in support of income-varying cost-of-living indices in the UK, see






h%g  and {<N,F>
g }
h = <N,F>
h%g   ~N, ~F, ~g,~h( 7 )
For an equal absolute sacrifice income tax, with u:￿+￿￿+ the relevant utility of income function,
N
u gives the associated tax on utilities, which is of course lump-sum. The deformation procedure
could also be used to transform a nominally-specified income tax or tax and benefit system <N,F>
into the corresponding regime in real income terms if the cost of living differed in different income
groups: if the real value of a nominal income x is g(x), <N,F>
g is the real tax system.
7 
The deformation function g effects a variable stretch or shrink of pre-tax relative income
differentials. When measured in the new units, g(x) rather than x, overall inequality is different.
We can select a g-function to effect any given inequality change in an income distribution. In
particular, deformations can be selected to transform tax regimes under comparison to the point
where the (induced) pre-tax distributions are the same. This procedure can be thought of as
transplanting the respective tax systems into a host distribution, a common baseline or reference
situation, in which the standard Jakobsson-Kakwani results can be applied to draw out
redistributive inferences from local progression comparisons.
To fix ideas, consider a comparison between the Israeli and British tax and benefit
systems. We will actually undertake such a comparison later. The regimes <NISR,FISR> and
<NUK,FUK> are the material for analysis. The idea is to identify the transformation function g(.)
which would deform FISR into FUK; and then to ask, how does the Israeli tax and benefit system
act on this particular function of the shekel? Its action could be compared directly with that of
NUK, for both now apply to the same distribution, FUK:
g = FUK
-1%FISR  <  <NISR,FISR>
g = <NISR
g,FUK> (8)
If, having identified g in this way, we should find that NISR
g |RP NUK, for example, then we would
know that the Israeli transplant has more progressivity than UK schedule whenever both are
applied to any common distribution: in particular, when both are applied to FUK, as is in fact the
case. Normative significance comes by applying the Atkinson (1970) theorem. Having scaled NISR
g
to have the same yield as NUK (a residual-progression-neutral device to which we shall return),
it follows from NISR
g |RP NUK that welfare is higher, and inequality lower, after application of8 A yield comparison between NUK and the unscaled NISR
g would make little sense. For both international and
intertemporal comparisons, normative significance can only come by standardizing yields. See Formby and Smith (1986) and
Lambert and  Pfähler (1987) on this.
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the (scaled) Israeli transplant than after application of the actual UK schedule.
8   The procedure
just described for achieving a normatively significant local-to-global comparison takes the UK as
baseline; we might have chosen Israel instead. There is clearly an ‘independence of baseline’ issue
to be resolved; we turn to this shortly. 
In general terms, let <N1,F1> and <N2,F2> be two regimes. The deformation procedure
can be used to transplant from both systems into a ‘reference’ distribution, call it Fo, by identifying
the appropriate transformation functions gi, i=1,2:
gi = F0
-1%Fi   <  <Ni,Fi>
gi = <Ni
gi,Fo> (9)
An unambiguous local progression comparison between N1
g1 and N2
g2, if such occurs, can be
represented as a partial progressivity ordering over regimes, conditioned by Fo, call it |P￿Fo:
<N1,F1> |P￿Fo <N2,F2> @ N1
g1 |RP N2
g2   where gi = F0
-1%Fi, i=1,2   (10)
The defining characteristic of a successful ordering by |P￿Fo is that one transplant has
unambiguously more progressivity than the other whenever both are applied to any common
distribution of income:




g2,F3>  ~F3  (11)
in particular, when both are applied to F0, as is in fact the case. (For the result in (11), just
combine (10) with (4)). The transplant-and-compare procedure ‘corrects’ N1 and N2 for inequality
and size differences (if any) between the distributions to which they apply, and enables valid
Lorenz and Suits findings to be drawn from a local comparison. Normative significance again
comes by appropriate scaling, this time  to create an equal yield comparison with respect to Fo,
and inequality and welfare superiority of one scaled transplant over the other follows. We turn
next to the independence of baseline question in this general scenario. 
4.  INDEPENDENCE OF BASELINE
Suppose we selected Fo as the reference distribution, and found <N1,F1> |P￿Fo <N2,F2>
following the transplant-and-compare procedure. That is, we pronounce that regime 1 has more
progressivity than regime 2 in the conditional sense. Had we instead made another choice of
baseline, say Go, would this conclusion be maintained, i.e. would we find <N1,F1> |P￿Go <N2,F2>?
Might this alternative comparison fail, or even be thrown into reverse? It turns out that the7
comparison can only be guaranteed the same if  Fo and Go are linked in a very special way:
Theorem 1
The orderings |P￿Fo and |P￿Go are the same @ G0
-1%F0 = g is isoelastic (@ } A,b>0 : g(x) = Ax
b).
For the proof, see the Appendix. The implications of this result are significant. If x has
distribution function F0  then g(x) = (G0
-1%F0)(x) has distribution function G0, i.e. g maps from
F0 to G0. Theorem 1 thus says that structural progression comparisons can be guaranteed invariant
to the choice of baseline if and only if the candidate reference distributions are isoelastic
transformations of one another. 
This is not to say that, given two regimes <N1,F1> and <N2,F2>, and alternative reference
distributions F0 and G0 not isoelastically linked, the two structural progression comparisons will
necessarily be found to be different. Independence of baseline can of course be checked
empirically: we return to this issue later. The analyst’s main interest would be in  transplanting
into one or other of the actual distributions, F1 and F2, as we suggested for the illustrative
UK/Israeli case. Theorem 1 also tells us that these two must themselves be linked by an isoelastic
transformation if the potential for dependency of conclusions on the baseline is to be avoided. 
This admissibility condition becomes clearer upon transforming into logarithms. If F1 and
F2 belong to a family of income distributions which, in logarithms, is location-and-scale-invariant
(the lognormal family is a good example), then any member of this family can be selected as the
host distribution for the transplant-and-compare procedure. If this is not (obviously) the case, the
comparison can still be safely undertaken, using either F1 or F2 as host, if in logarithms these two
distributions differ only in location and scale. If in logarithms F1 or F2 do not differ only in location
and scale, then findings may depend upon which distribution is chosen as the baseline (but this can
be checked empirically, see on). In terms of deformation functions, the following theorem
summarizes the situation:
Theorem 2
Let <N1,F1> and <N2,F2> be two regimes.
(a) Let Fo be any income distribution such that g1 = F0
-1%F1 and g2 = F0
-1%F2 are both isoelastic. If
RP1(g1
-1(x)) ￿ RP2(g2
-1(x))  ~x then <N1,F1> |P￿Fo <N2,F2>.9 An analogous result holds for liability progression in the case of income tax schedules Ti(x) > 0 and T2(x) > 0 ~x.
Because of the complications which arise in making local and global comparisons of taxes with thresholds and tax and benefit
schedules (see footnote 6) - and also because of the lesser normative interest in tax burden distributions - we do not discuss
these results further here.
10 The transformation g(x) = e
￿x
￿ takes one from the lognormal distribution LN(￿,1) to LN(￿￿+￿,￿1), where ￿ and
1 are the mean and variance of the logarithms of incomes; to transform from the Pareto distribution P(0,.) to P(0,￿), where 0
is a common threshold, apply g(x) = 01-./￿x
./￿; and to go from the Singh-Maddala distribution SM(.,b,q) to SM(￿,b,q), use g(x)
= x
./￿. 
11 In fact, the conclusion remains the same after transplanting into any Fo which has an isoelastic link with F1 and
F2: see part (a) of the theorem. By setting g = ￿ (the identity operator), we obtain a variant of the Jakobsson-Kakwani result
from (b): if RP1(x) ￿ RP2(x) ~x then for any admissible distribution F, <N1,F> |P￿Fo <N2,F> for all admissible Fo.
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(b) Suppose that g = F1
-1%F2 is isoelastic. If RP1(g(x)) ￿ RP2(x) ~x then  <N1,F1> |P￿F1 <N2,F2>
and <N1,F1> |P￿F2 <N2,F2>. 
(c) If g = F1
-1%F2 is not isoelastic, the partial orderings over regimes by |P￿F1 and |P￿F2 are
different.
9
Part (a) of this theorem applies in particular if F1 and F2 are (or can be fitted as)
lognormal. The analyst could then transplant schedules into the standard lognormal, in which the
logarithms of incomes are distributed as N(0,1), prior to undertaking comparisons. Other suitable
families for such standardization using the transplant-and-compare procedure are the Pareto and
Singh-Maddala.
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Part (b) may be applied when F1 and F2 themselves differ in logarithms by location and
scale, but no family of which they are members is apparent. The criterion is a straightforward
residual progression test; g(x) is the transformation mapping incomes from the distribution of
regime 2 into the corresponding ones in regime 1; progression is compared at every distribution
2 income level; an unambiguous comparison ensures that, after transplanting into either 1 or 2,
1 has more global progressivity than 2.
11 
Part (c) of the theorem stresses that in the absence of a location-and-scale relation
between distribution functions in logarithms, conclusions may be dependent on the baseline
selected; this becomes an empirical question. 
There are a number of additional grounds on which isoelasticity of the g-function linking
the two distributions  F1 and F2 is desirable for the transplant-and-compare procedure. Suppose,
first, that the income tax is proportional (distributionally neutral) in each of two regimes 1 and 2.
Then surely we would say that both regimes have equivalent (and zero) effective progression, no
matter what the pre-tax income distributions F1 and F2  may be. The transplant-and-compare
procedure does not respect this principle unless g = F1
-1%F2 is isoelastic. More generally, if the9
transplant-and-compare procedure reveals structural progression equivalence upon transplantation
from regime 2 into regime 1, then equivalence will not be found using the reverse transplantation
unless g = F1
-1%F2 is isoelastic. We state these results formally in the following  theorem, whose
proof may be found in the Appendix:
 
Theorem 3
Given income distributions F1 and F2, it is necessary and sufficient that g = F1
-1%F2 be isoelastic
in order that either of the following two properties should hold:
(a) N proportional @N
g proportional 
(b) N2
g ￿RP N1 @ N2 ￿RP N1
g-1 
Although flat taxes and structural progression equivalence are unlikely to obtain in realistic
applications, these results could be argued to reveal a flaw in principle of the transplant-and-
compare procedure when pre-tax income distributions are not isoelastically linked. 
5. EXAMPLES AND RELATIONSHIP WITH EXISTING LITERATURE 
Some simple numerical examples based on linear tax and benefit schedules demonstrate
the insights to be gained using the transplant-and-compare procedure, and also the limitations of
it. Let N1(x) = c1x+d1 be net income in regime 1, for which residual progression is RP1(x) =
x/(x+d1/c1), which reduces as income increases. Let N2(x) = c2x + d2 be net income in regime 2,
and suppose that this has more local progression at each income value x (i.e. d2/c2 < d1/c1). Let
<N1,F1> and <N2,F2> be the two regimes, where F1 g F 2. If we did not take account of the
difference in income distribution in the two regimes, we would say that N2(x) engenders
unambiguously more global progressivity than N1(x). Suppose, though, that in logarithms, F2 is
obtained from F1 by a rightward shift in location. This moves the people to whom N2(x) applies
into regions of low progression, lower, possibly, than the progression experienced by
correspondingly-placed people in F1. The global progressivity comparison might now be
ambiguous or even reversed. The transplant-and-compare procedure will reveal what happens.
Taking N1(x1) = 0.2 + 0.8x1 and N2(x2) = .25 + 0.75x2 as the two schedules, we simulated
income distribution F1 as the standard lognormal, ln x1 ￿ N(0,1), and took income distribution F2
to be defined by the transformation x2 = g(x1) = Ax1
b or:12 We did not plot the curve for the raw (untransplanted) schedule 2 on this graph, alongside the transplant of 2 and
the curve for 1, not least because the difference in location and scale between distributions 1 and 2 would place the two raw
curves in different regions on the graph, making slope comparisons impossible (recall a=3 and b=1), but also because a
comparison of residual progression between raw schedules is in any case devoid of global consequence, given the change of
income distribution. We shall refrain from such comparisons in the rest of the paper too.
13 One cannot transform isoelastically between distributions with intersecting Lorenz curves. The reason is that the
transformation g(x) = Axb compresses relative income differentials for b<1 and expands them for b>1; hence there is, in
Moyes’s (1994) terminology, ‘dominance in relative differentials’ between the untransformed and transformed distributions.
14 In Norregaard (1990), estimates of liability progression of income tax systems (assumed constant at all income
levels) are presented for a range of countries, alongside measures which depend upon the respective distributions of the tax
burden. The correspondence of the rankings “in broad terms” is noted (page 94), but the differences which occur are attributed
to factors which exclude pre-tax inequality differences.
10
ln x2 = a + b.ln x1 (12)
(where a = ln A) with a=3 and b=1, that is, a simple rightward shift of all incomes in logarithms.
We then transplanted from 2 into the standard lognormal distribution of regime 1 (using part (b)
of theorem 2) to make the residual progression comparison. 
The most convenient way to compare residual progression measures, which are
elasticities, is of course to plot in logs and then inspect slopes. We therefore plotted on the same
graph ln N1(x1) and [ln N2(x2)-a]/b against (in each case) ln x1; we shall call such curves log
transplant curves in the rest of the paper, for obvious reasons. These curves depict the logarithm
of post-tax income as a function of the logarithm of pre-tax income, after transplantation from
regime 2 into the standard lognormal income distribution of regime 1, and their slopes at each
point are the relevant residual progression measures. See figure 1. As we suggested might happen,
there is indeed less residual progression (and therefore progressivity) in the transplanted regime
2 than in regime 1 - despite 2 having more progression at each fixed and common income value
than 1.
12 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
The transformation of (12) does not change the inequality in pre-tax incomes when b=1:
incomes grow equiproportionately in the transition from F1 to F2. Because progression declines
with income growth, the direction of change in effective progression is straightforward, and
conveniently summarized by comparing residual progression values at the two mean incomes
(Dilnot et al., 1984). When b g1, we can think of the transplant-and-compare procedure as
“correcting for inequality”, for it is precisely when the transformation g(x) = Ax
b has b g1 that
the pre-tax distributions of the two regimes have different Lorenz curves.
13 In this case, there is
scope for ambiguous global outcomes.
14
To illustrate this, we formed another new income distribution, call it F2(, from F1 by15  Lambert and Pf¨ahler (1992) show that unambiguous results do not obtain for the Musgrave and Thin scenario.
The case a g 1 and b = , which could also be explored, is that of equiproportionate income growth. Moyes (1989) has shown
that, given N(x), the effect of this sort of distributional change on global progressivity is neutral (unambiguously equalizing)
if and only if N(x) has constant (everywhere increasing) residual progression. 
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selecting a(=3 and b(=5 for the transformation in (14), thereby producing a marked increase in
pre-tax inequality. When N2 was applied to F2( (call this regime 2(), and transplanted into 1, the
residual progression comparison with 1 indeed became ambiguous: see figure 1 again. Progression
became higher at the bottom, and lower at the top, in the transplant of 2( relative to 1; this takes
account of the movement of people from the center ground of F1 into the tails of F2( as inequality
was increased. Whenever there is an inequality change between regimes, Dilnot et al.’s procedure
of comparing residual progression values at mean income levels gives only a partial picture: an
inspection of complete RP-profiles is needed to make an informative comparison (as in our figure
1).
Part (c) of theorem 2 and theorem 3 forewarn of baseline dependency problems if the
deformation function g(.) is not isoelastic. Another numerical example illustrates how this can
happen quite starkly. Let N1(x1) = 1 + 0.5x1 and N2(x2) = 1 + 0.25x2, let F1 be any income
distribution and let F2 be defined from F1 by x2 = g(x1) = x1 + 1. The transplant of N1 into
distribution 2 is N1
g(x2) = 1.5 + 0.5x2, and the transplant of N2 into distribution 1 is N2
g-1(x1) =
0.25 + 0.25 x1. It follows that N2|RP N1
g and N1 |RP N2
g-1. The transplant-and-compare procedure
would thus provide two diametrically opposed conclusions about progression and progressivity
in this example, depending whether one selected the distribution of x1 or that of x2 as baseline.
This has happened because F1 and F2 do not differ in logarithms by location and scale (but it is
not bound to happen in all such cases, as we shall see later).
One can use the isoelastic specification in conjunction with numerical examples of
schedules N(x) to examine the effects of distributional change per se on progressivity. For
example, Musgrave and Thin’s (1948, p. 510) speculation, already referred to, that "... the less
equal the distribution of income before tax, the more potent will be a (given) progressive tax
structure in equalizing income" can be put to the test for any chosen schedule N(x) by setting b
< 1 and comparing N with N
g. We leave such experiments to the reader.
15
It has been conventional practice in intertemporal studies to isolate the progressivity
effects of tax policy changes from those due to distributional or population shifts. For example,
Kasten et al. (1994) use so-called "income-fixed simulations" to evaluate the effects of U.S.16 In our simplified model, the possibility that different income sources would be taxed differently is excluded,
so that changes in the composition of income would have no effect on progressivity. 
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federal income tax reforms, applying the tax laws after successive reforms all to data of the same
year (ibid., pages 10-11). They found substantially different interpretations of the policy effects
of the reforms depending on the year to which the tax changes were applied, and accounted for
this 'baseline dependence' property by pointing to the differential income growth and changes in
the composition of income that took place between alternative base years.
16 In international
comparisons, too, practitioners have sought to isolate the progressivity effects of tax schedule
differences from those due to distributional differences. In Norregaard (1990), for example, the
progressivity impact of superimposing each country's tax system on a "standard pre-tax income
distribution" is presented, with Germany selected as the standard, but the possibility of baseline-
dependent conclusions is not noted (ibid., pages 98-99). 
Although our own approach uses actual tax laws and actual distributions, without
simulation or superimposition, it plainly can be adapted to the two-stage approach. At the first
stage, the existing Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani (1976) results allow global and normative
implications to be drawn out of residual progression comparisons, since the change in tax law is
applied to a fixed income distribution. The "transplant-and-compare" procedure can then be
applied in the second stage, when the income distribution is adjusted given the new tax law,
providing a means to draw out global and normative properties of pre-tax distributional change
per se from an analysis of local progression (as between the new schedule and its transplant back
into the old distribution).
In Hayes et al. (1995), an algorithm is given for computing residual progression at
percentile points in the pre-tax income distribution when the data is in grouped form. This
algorithm is used to derive and compare progression profiles for US federal income taxes at a grid
of percentile points p ￿ [0,1] for each year from t=1950 to t=1987; inter alia, a contour plot of
progression RPt(Ft
-1(p)) is derived with percentiles p on one axis and years t on the other. There
is a link between this procedure and ours. In fact the two procedures are exactly equivalent when
the distributions are isoelastically linked - and only then: 
Theorem 4
Let <N1,F1> and <N2,F2> be two regimes. If and only if the function g = F1
-1%F2 is isoelastic are17 And in fact for all other income distributions Fo such that F0
-1%F2 is isoelastic. 
18 This is because, with gi = Fo
-1%Fi, we have Fo(gi(x)) = Fi(x). 
19 In fact, they noted the lack of an "outlier year": residual progression dominance did not actually obtain
between any two of the years under study.
20 We noted earlier that nominal tax systems can be converted into real terms using deformations. Theorem 2
forewarns of baseline dependency problems if cost-of-living conversion functions are not isoelastic. Assuming isoelasticity,
there is in fact no need for the analyst to convert nominal tax systems into real terms before applying the transplant-and-
compare procedure. Let ci(x) be the variable cost-of-living conversion function for regime <Ni,Fi> (i=1,2), so that <Ni,Fi>ci =
<Ni
ci,Fi% ci
-1> is regime i in real terms. If hi converts from the real income distribution Fi% ci
-1 into a chosen baseline Fo, then
gi = hi%ci would convert from the nominal Fi directly into Fo. Since by (7) we have {<Ni,Fi>ci }hi = <Ni,Fi>gi, the analyst will
arrive at the same transplant whether or not cost-of-living conversions are first undertaken.
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the following two statements equivalent:
(a) RP1(F1
-1(p)) ￿ RP2(F2
-1(p)) ~p ￿ [0,1]; 
(b) <N1,F1> |P￿Fo <N2,F2> for F0 = F1, F2.
17
The proof is in the Appendix, but the connection is easy to see. In theorem 2(a), the
function gi assigns to each income level x in distribution i= 1,2 the income g(x) in the reference
distribution Fo which is at the same percentile as x.
18 Similarly, in theorem 2(b), the function g
assigns to each income in distribution 2 the income in distribution 1 which occurs at the same
percentile. Therefore the residual progression comparisons cited in parts (a) and (b) of  theorem
2 can both be written in the form RP1(F1
-1(p)) ￿ RP2(F2
-1(p)) ~p, which is the condition  given in
part (a) of theorem 4 and used by Hayes et al. (1995) without regard to the isoelasticity question.
Global and normatively significant conclusions can thus be drawn from the Hayes et al. percentile-
by-percentile comparison procedure only  when the income distributions concerned are linked by
isoelastic transformations; this is because their procedure comes down to the transplant-and-
compare procedure in that case; Hayes et al. were wrong in giving the impression (on page 468)
that in general the Jakobsson and Kakwani results establish global progressivity enhancement
from local percentile dominance.
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6. IMPLEMENTATION: INTERTEMPORAL AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS
Suppose that we have microdata for pre- and post-tax equivalized family or individual
income, for two regimes, call them 1 and 2, in the form of samples, of sizes n1 and n2. We call the
sample values simply ‘incomes’ in what follows.
20 Typically, the tax systems display horizontal
inequity (HI), i.e. there is not perfect association between pre- and post-tax incomes. The first21 The Lorenz curves for net income Ni(x), i=1,2, are then defined by accumulation points on the sample pre-tax
ordered concentration curves for post-tax income. 
22 In this case, the Lorenz curves for net income Ni(x), i=1,2 are of course the sample Lorenz curves.
23 Howeever it is shown in Dardanoni and Lambert (2001) that for any given dataset with HI, the schedule obtained
by smoothing will have a more progressive stance than the one obtained by sorting.  Since the degree of  HI affects this
discrepancy in stance, comparisons between regimes with different degrees of HI can be affected by the choice between
smoothing and sorting.
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task is to construct net income schedules Ni(x), i=1,2, to represent the progressivity (vertical
stance) of the two regimes. 
There are two prevailing views on how to do this. One approach, pioneered by Musgrave
(1990) and Aronson et al. (1994), takes as starting point that the vertical stance of a tax system
is defined by its differential-narrowing effect on average between pre-tax unequals, with effects
around this average counted as classical HI. The analyst could construct the Ni(x), i=1,2, as
smoothed average relationships between pre- and post-tax incomes in the two samples, using
either close equals groups (Lambert and Ramos, 1997) or the kernel (Duclos and Lambert,
2000).
21 According to the other approach, vertical equity is about the choice of post-tax income
distribution given the pre-tax income distribution (and HI about the process of taxation). To
accord with this view, the Ni(x), i=1,2, should generate the sample post-tax distributions from the
sample pre-tax distributions. The unique way to construct such functions Ni(x) is simply to sort
separately the pre- and post-tax income vectors in each sample i, breaking the disassociation
which is present; Ni(x) becomes the post-tax income whose rank is the same as the pre-tax rank
of x (King, 1983, Jenkins, 1988, 1994).
22
The sorting procedure is both sound and simple, whilst the close equals and kernel
approaches, equally sound, are technically more demanding. For the illustrations to follow, we
adopted the simpler sorting procedure, but nothing in this paper depends on how the analyst
chooses to generate the net income schedules Ni(x), i=1,2, in terms of which the progressivity
analysis proceeds.
23 Either way, the analyst now has ordered sample values for pre-tax income xi
and post-tax income yi in sample i, i=1,2, and can create the empirical distribution functions for
pre-tax incomes, call these Fi. Denote by Fi* the distribution function for ln xi. 
The first thing to check is whether the Fi* belong to a location and scale invariant family.
The obvious and easy one to check is the normal (corresponding to lognormality of income
distributions). The goodness-of-fit test of D’Agostino and Pearson is straightforward, depending
on the 3rd and 4th cumulants (Cox and Hinkley, 1974, p. 71-2). If the fit is good, the two24 If n1 = n2 = n, select p = k/n, k = 1,2,.....n, and set xi(p) equal to the kth value of xi. If n1 g n2, select p = k/min{
n1,n2}, k = 1,2,....min{ n1,n2}, and use interpolation to locate xi(p) between two sample values of xi.
25 We thank Jean-Yves Duclos,  Shlomo Yitzhaki and Alan Duncan for help with the provision of this data.
EBORTAX computes tax liabilities and benefit entitlements on the basis of actual circumstances, rather than using recorded
payments and receipts (which are prone to error), and has been developed by Alan Duncan, whom we thank for assistance.
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distributions can be transformed to N(0,1), for example, replacing ln xi by ai + bi.ln xi where ai and
bi solve ai + biµi = 0 and bi1i = 1, where µi and 1i are the mean and standard deviation of
logarithms in sample i. The residual progression comparison between transplanted tax systems
can be made by inspecting slopes in the plots of ai + bi.ln yi against ai + bi.ln xi for i=1,2 on the
same graph.
If the lognormal fit is unacceptable, then as in scenario (b) of theorem 2, the next step is
to check for the closeness of the two vectors ln x1 and a + b.ln x2 (of lengths n1 and n2), searching
for the a and b which minimize an appropriate distance measure. The straightforward approach
is to create quantiles: let xi(p) be the income at rank p in sample i, where p ￿ (0,1] indexes a set
of equally-spaced positions.
24 One can then find the a and b which minimize the Euclidean distance
between the vectors ln x1(p) and a + b.ln x2(p). This amounts to finding the point in the subspace
of 2-dimensional Euclidean space spanned by a unit vector and ln x2(p) which is closest to ln
x1(p); the familiar OLS estimators of the constant and slope in a regression of ln x1(p) on ln x2(p)
provide the requisite a and b; the centered R
2 statistic is the appropriate measure of goodness-of-
fit. If the fit is good, the tax function of regime 2 can be transplanted into the distribution of
regime 1, using the entailed a and b, and the residual progression comparison then made, using
log transplant curves as before; in this case, the curves will be of ln y1 against ln x1 and a + b.ln
y2 against a + b.ln x2, plotted on the same graph. If the fit is poor, then in accord with part (c) of
theorem 2, the transplant-and-compare procedure itself may be unsafe; the use of OLS estimators
is then unsafe a fortiori. . 
We illustrate these procedures for the tax-and-benefit systems of Canada, Israel and the
UK. The Canadian data comprises 5000 cases drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finances for
1981 and 1990 of Statistics Canada. The Israeli data comprises 5212 cases drawn from the
Family Expenditure Survey for 1992 of the Central Bureau of Statistics, and the UK data,
comprising 2721 cases, is adapted from the Family Expenditure Survey for 1993 of the Central
Statistical Office, using the package EBORTAX to compute tax liabilities according to the 1993/4
tax code.
25 From this data, we drew each household’s original (pre-tax and pre-benefit) and final26 Davidson and Duclos used much larger samples than we did.
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(post-tax and post-benefit) money incomes, excluded all cases in which either was zero, and then
deflated into units of equivalent income using a deflator of the form m = (NA + 3NC)
￿ from the
doubly-parametric family of Cutler and Katz (1992), where NA and NC are the numbers of adults
and children in the family and 3, ￿ ￿ [0,1] tell the importance of children and economies of scale
in determining the number of adult-equivalents. We selected parameter values 3 = ￿ = ½ for the
illustrations, sorted both the original and final income values and trimmed the top ½ percent of
these values from each sample in order to eliminate dependency of results on outliers. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2(a) shows the distribution functions FCAN81* and FCAN90* for logged Canadian
original incomes in the 1981 and 1990 samples. Normality is rejected by the D’Agostino and
Pearson test in each case. But the second procedure reveals that these distributions differ
essentially only by location and scale: when we fitted the 1990 distribution to that of 1981, the
OLS estimates were a = .6645 and b = .9786, with an R
2 of 0.9975. Figure 2(a) shows the fit. In
figure 2(b), the log transplant curves are shown, whose slopes reveal the residual progression of
the 1981 tax and benefit schedule, and of the 1990 one transplanted into the 1981 distribution.
The 1990 transplant is flatter everywhere, which means that the system had become locally more
progressive at all income levels by 1990. This finding corroborates that of Davidson and Duclos
(1997), based on Lorenz curves, that the system had become globally more progressive by
1990.
26
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3(a) shows the distribution functions FISR* and FUK* for logged Israeli 1992 and
UK 1993 original incomes. Normality is again rejected, and this time the second procedure reveals
a less convincing location-and-scale relationship: when we fitted the UK distribution to that of
Israel, the OLS estimates were a = 4.1177 and b = .7058, with an R
2 of 0.8489. Figure 3(a) shows
the fit, which is visibly less good. In figure 3(b), the log transplant curves are shown, predicated
on the OLS values of a and b. Let us take these curves at face value and consider what they
suggest about the two tax systems. A dotted line has been added to this figure, a “45
o line”, above
which net benefit recipients are located, and below which, net taxpayers. There are substantial
income ranges, both for net benefit recipients and taxpayers, in which residual progression is
constant in each system. Residual progression is also substantially higher for benefit recipients27 This is a common feature of tax and benefit systems: withdrawal rates of benefits are typically high relative to tax
rates. 
28  In the general case, with regimes <N1,F1> and <N2,F2> and  g = F1
-1%F2 as before, so that <N2,F2>g = <N2
g,F1> is
the transplant from regime 2 into the distribution of regime 1, the procedure to construct the log transplant curve for the
schedule N2
g is as follows. Plot against the log of a given pre-tax income x1 in distribution 1, at quantile q say,  the log of
another income in distribution 1, call it y1, which is such that its quantile in distribution 1 is the same as that to which a pre-tax
income at quantile q in distribution 2 is mapped by N2. Now vary x1 to trace out the log transplant curve.
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than for taxpayers in both systems.
27 The tapering of benefits is more gradual for Israel. The
crossovers of the 45
o line differ: Israel still gives benefits beyond the point where the UK starts
to tax. In the UK benefit range, the UK system is more progressive than the Israeli one; in the UK
tax range, the UK system is less progressive than the Israeli one.  
These insights unfortunately cannot, as far as we know, be corroborated by reference to
another study. The poorer R
2 gives us less confidence in the reliability of the isoelastic model in
this case than in the Canadian one, but yields some intriguing facets of the two tax and benefit
systems which could be further investigated. If the R
2 is rejected, then the two distributions cannot
be held to differ in logarithms only in location and scale. In this case, conclusions might be
dependent on the choice of Israel as baseline - and, of course, the use of the OLS estimators  a
and b to construct log transplant curves becomes inappropriate anyway. We should then check
directly whether the transplants of the UK schedule into Israel and of the Israeli schedule into the
UK yield qualitatively different conclusions. 
 It is straightforward, though cumbersome (relative to the very easy procedure using OLS
estimators), to construct log transplant curves empirically.
28 In figure 4, parts (a) and (b), we
show these curves, first transplanting from the UK into Israel and then vice versa. The slopes
contain the relevant information, and everything we said about slopes in figure 3 holds true in
these two graphs also (as do the remarks about crossovers with the 45
o line). The only significant
difference between figures 3(b) and 4 is that the Israeli curve lies everywhere above the UK curve
in each part of figure 4, whilst the two curves cross in figure 3(b).  This difference would matter
if we cared to compare tax yields but, as we have said, the yield of one schedule cannot
meaningfully be compared with that of the transplant of the other in any case.  We may conclude
that baseline independence holds for the UK/Israeli comparison, and that in fact our acceptance
of the R
2, and use of the OLS estimators for the isoelastic model, led to all significant facets of
the two tax and benefit systems being captured.
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]29 Recall footnote 14.
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The isoelastic model might be more appropriate for intertemporal than for international
comparisons, because distributional change is gradual in the former case whilst inequality
differences can be appreciable between countries. If isoelasticity does hold between distributions
in a country in a succession of years, then multiple log transplant curves can be graphed
simultaneously, using successive OLS estimators, to detect trends. In the absence of isoelasticity,
the task of making successive pairwise tests for baseline independence could be formidable. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
 Local progression comparisons are perilous when tax and benefit schedules operate on
different income distributions. We advocate a ‘transplant-and-compare’ procedure designed to
correct regimes for inequality and size differences and enable baseline comparisons of residual
progression to be undertaken, using ‘log transplant curves’. From an unambiguous comparison,
a robust global ordering of original regimes by their redistributive effects in terms of Lorenz and
Suits curves is implied. Even from a comparison in which the residual progression comparison
varies with income, insights can be drawn out that would otherwise be inaccessible.
The crucial ‘independence of baseline’ property holds only when deformation functions
are isoelastic. As we have seen, the transplant-and-compare procedure is not reliable unless the
transformation function between distributions is isoelastic. In particular, problems are inevitable
when the pre-tax Lorenz curves for the two regime cross,
29 but we can make approximations. Our
procedures provide these approximations, along with appropriate goodness-of-fit indicators. If
we accept the isoelastic fit, the transplant-and-compare procedure can be applied and illuminating
results derived from the resulting log transplant curves. If we reject the isoelastic model, empirical
transplant procedures can be applied, but it can be argued that the transplant-and-compare
methodology itself is not wholly satisfactory in such cases (in view of our theorem 4, not least)
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APPENDIX
For for any schedule M and deformation function g, we have












where 5g denotes the elasticity of g, 5g(x) = xg’(x)/g(x). If g is isoelastic this reduces to
RPN
g(g(x)) = RPN(x) (B)
The Proof of Theorem 1
=    Suppose <N1,F1> |P￿Fo <N2,F2>, i.e. N1
g1 |RP N2
g2 where gi = F0
-1%Fi, i=1,2. Let hi =
Go
-1%Fi. To prove <N1,F1> |P￿Go <N2,F2> when g = G0
-1%F0 is isoelastic we need to show N1
h1 |RP
N2
h2 in this case. Now g%gi = hi, so by (7),  Ni
hi = (Ni
gi)
g. Setting N = Ni
gi in (B), isoelasticity of g
implies that the residual progression of Ni
hi at g(x) equals that of Ni






<   Select N1 and N2 such that N1
g1 = ￿N2
g2 for some  ￿ g1, i.e. N1
g1 ￿RP N2
g2. If the partial
orderings |P￿Fo and |P￿Go are the same, then N1
h1 ￿RP N2
h2. Now substitute N = Ni
gi in (A) and
conclude that 5g(N1
g1(x)) =  5g(N2
g2(x)) ~x. This forces N1
g1 and N2
g2 to be identical on any interval
on which 5g’ g 0. No such interval exists, hence g is isoelastic.
 
The Proof of Theorem 2
From (B), if g is isoelastic the residual progression of Ni
gi at x equals that of Ni at g
-1(x),
~x. The result in (a) follows. For the results in (b), first set Fo = F1 (so that g1 is the identity
operator and g2 = g) and then set Fo= F2 (so that that g1 = g
-1 and g2 is the identity operator).
Everything follows. The result in (c) is immediate from theorem 1.
The Proof of Theorem 3
If g is isoelastic then from (B) N
g is proportional (has unit residual progression) if and only
if N is, and N2
g ￿RP N1 and N2 ￿RP N1
g-1 are both equivalent to RP2(x) = RP1(g(x)) ~x. Hence (a)
and (b) hold. 
Suppose now that (a) holds and let N(x) = ￿x ~x where ￿ g1. From (A), 5g(￿x) =  5g(x)
~x. This forces ￿x and x to be identical on any interval on which 5g’ g 0. No such interval can20
exist, so g is isoelastic.
Suppose now that (b) holds, i.e. N2
g ￿RP N1 @N2 ￿RP N1
h where for convenience we write
h = g
-1. Let N2 = ￿.N1
h for some ￿  g1. Now apply (A). From N2
g  ￿RP N 1 we obtain
5g(N2(x)).RP2(x) = 5g(x).RP1(g(x))  ~x and from N2  ￿RP N 1
h we obtain 5h(N1(y)).RP1(y) =
5h(y).RP2(h(y)) ~y. Substituting x = h(y) and y = g(x) in these, comparing the two values of
RP2(x)/RP1(y) which are implied and noting that 5h(y) = 1/5g(x), we find that 5g(N2(x)) =
1/5h(N1(y)), equivalently 5g(N2(x)) = 5g(N1
h(x)) ~x. This forces N2 and N1
h to be identical on any
interval on which 5g’ g 0. No such interval can exist, so g is isoelastic.
The Proof of Theorem 4
 We prove that isoelasticity of g is equivalent to (a) @ (b) for F0 =  F2. We thus compare
<N1,F1>
g = <N1
g,F2> with <N2,F2>. The analysis for  F0 =  F1 is similar. Since g = G0
-1%F0, we can
write F2(g(x)) = F1(x) = p ￿ [0,1]. It follows from (A) with N = N1 that 





















Hence, if g is isoelastic, the percentiles comparison and the residual progression
comparison of <N1
g,F2> and <N2,F2> come down to the same thing. Suppose conversely that
these two comparisons are always identical. Then 5g(N1(x)) =  5g(x) ~x for all possible N1. Taking
the case N1(x) = ￿x ~x where ￿ g1, we see that there can be no interval on which 5g’ g 0, i.e. g
must be isoelastic.21
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